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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
DAMAGES FOR SERVICES RENDERED IN RELIANCE ON
PROMISE TO DEVISE UNPERFORMED
In May of 1948 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided two cases which
involved claims against decedents' estates. Plaintiffs in both cases alleged breach
of oral contracts by decedents to will claimants their estates in consideration for
services rendered to decedents by claimants. Both claims were rejected by the
Court because (1) In Re Stichler's Estate' "the alleged contract was not sufficiently
proved and furthermore because no evidence was submitted to establish the ex-
tent and value of the services rendered" and (2) In Re Jones Estate2 "because the
evidence failed to establish a contract."
Measure of Damages was not in issue in either of these cases. But in the
Stichler Case Justice Stearne said,
"Furthermore on a breach of a contract to will the measure of damages
is the value of the services rendered and not of the estate promised to be
willed."
In the Jones case the same Supreme Court Justice used stronger language
saying,
"Even if a contract to will the whole or part of an estate had been
proved and a breach shov/n, the measure of damages is the value of
the services rendered and not the estate promised to be given."
This type of claim has arisen many times in Pennsylvania and the Courts
have disclosed unmistakable judicial antipathy toward them. Justice Strong in
Graham v. Graham's Executorss justified the Court's attitude when he said,
"The temptation to set up claims against the estates of decedents,
particularly such decedents as have left no lineal heirs, is very great.
It cannot be doubted that many such claims have been asserted, which
would never have been known, had it been possible for the decedent
to meet his alleged creditor in a court of justice. Not infrequently, we
witness a scramble for a dead man's effects, disreputable to those en-
gaged in it, and shocking to the moral sense of the community. Such
claims are always dangerous, and when they rest upon parol evidence,
they should be strictly scanned. Espcially, when an attempt is made,
under cover of parol contract, to effect the distribution different from
that which the law makes, or that which decedent has directed by his will,
should it meet with no favor in a court of law. Even if any such con-
tract may be enforced, it can only be, when it is clearly proved, by
direct and positive testimony, and when its terms are definite and
certain."
1 359 Pa. 262, 59 A. 2d 51 (1948).
2 359 Pa. 260, 59 A. 2d 50 (1948).
s 34 Pa. 475 (1859).
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After asserting the aforesaid reasons for using extreme care and caution in
ascertaining the validity of the alleged contract, the learned justice further said,
"But without pressing the insufficiency of the proof of the contract,
even if it were definite and certain, it by no means follows that the
measure of damages in an action for its breach, is the value of the thing
promised at the time of the breach."
Pennsylvania Courts have taken an inflexible stand in these cases and in a
long line of decisions' have reiterated the rule that the measure of damages is the
value of the services only, and not the value of the thing promised. But Williston
and other authorities5 do not differentiate between the measure of damages for
the breach of contract to devise or bequeath property and the measure of damages
for the breach of any other contract. Williston says,
"The measure of damages for the breach of a contract to devise or
bequeath property is the value of the property promised to be bequeathed
and devised. The measure of damages is aplied both as to devises of
real estate and bequest of money legacies."
Labatt in his comprehensive work, Commentaries on the Law of Master and Serv-
ant, published in 1913, flatly states,
"In an action on a contract to recompense services by a legacy or
devise, the measure of recovery is the value not of the services, but of
the property promiseid." 7
It is interesting to note that this learned authority, when his work was published,
recognized the above rule as the law of all jurisdictions and cited no cases which
adopted a contrary view.
The results of the Pennsylvania decisions seem unjust. In many situations
from which these cases arise the services rendered were of a most disagreeable
character and infirmities of the alleged promisor rendered many of the tasks very
unpleasant. Usually the decedent was a person of declining years, deserted by his
relatives and friends who shunned the distasteful tasks necessary to take care
of him. In desperation the aged person turned to a friend or housekeeper with
whom he contracted orally to devise a portion of or his entire estate in consideration
of services to be rendered in his care. The promisee toiled for many years at dis-
agreeable tasks which often greatly impaired the worker's health, in reliance on
the promise of a substantial legacy. Upon the death of the promisor failure co
4 Infra. Note 5; Infra. Note 10; Real Estate, 152 Pa. Super. 229, 56 A. 2d 241 (1948); In
re McWilliams Estate, 162 Pa. Super. 229, 56 A. 2d 241 (1948); Supra. Note 1; Supra. Note 2;
Infra, Note 9.
5 4 Page on Wills 1734 (Third Ed. 1941); 3 Sutherland, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
DAMAGES, 679 (1916); 3 Elliot, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, 2220
(1913).
6 5 Williston and Thompson, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, 1411 A. (Revised Ed. 1937).
7 2 Labatt, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT, 443 (Second
Ed. 1913).
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devise the promised legacy caused the promisee to institute action on the alleged
contract. In the majority of the cases the complainant was awarded merely "value
of services rendered", which was totally inadequate.
In one such case s an aged man requested the plaintiff to take care of him
and of his house. At first the woman refused to do so, but upon his promise to
devise to her his entire estate if she would comply with his request, she agreed.
The Court decided that "the contract was binding if one party renders services
under a proposed contract and the other accepts them, without formal, verbal,
or written acceptance thereof." The value of her services was estimated and the
period she worked for him after the first making of the contract covered a period
of 645 weeks. The verdict was in her favor for $3227, which was less than $5
per week.
In another case9 with a similar fact situation, the plaintiff was awarded a
sum computed on the basis of $10 per week as the value of services she rendered
to the decedent "on the faith of the agreement."
The decisions resolve themselves into three main categories (1) Where the
evidence fails to establish a contract' 0 (2) Where an agreement is unenforceable
because it does not satisfy the Statute of Frauds" and (3) Where sufficient
evidence is produced to establish a contract and it is not rendered unenforceable by
non-compliance with the Statute of Frauds.' 2 In (1) the Courts have either dis-
missed the claim or have awarded value of the services where the claimant could
sufficiently establish that the services were rendered and could overcome the
presumption of payment.1i The overwhelming majority of decisions have held in
(2) and (3) that the measure of damages is the value of the services rendered
and not the estate promised to be devised.
Obviously, the decisions rejecting the claim where the evidence fails to estab-
lish a contract are just. Any other conclusion would open the door to fraudulent
claims, and would be contrary to basic contract law.
The second category, in which the contract is stricken down because it does
not satisfy the Statute of Frauds, appears just under the existing circumstances.
However, in view of the fact that a claimant often endures his unpleasant and
distasteful tasks in reliance on the decedent's promise to will certain valuable
real property to him, the results of such decisions often seem inequitable. In
most cases, the plaintiff would not have rendered the services if he had been
8 Snyder v. McGill, Admrx., 265 Pa. 122, 108 A. 410 (1919).
9 Byrne's Estate, 122 Pa. Super. 413, 186 A. 187 (1936).
10 Supra. Note 2; Re Roberts Estate, 350 Pa. 467, 39 A. 2d 592 (1944); In Re Barry's Estate,
159 Pa. Super. 287, 48 A. 2d 29 (1946).
11 In Re Anderson Estate, 348 Pa. 294, 35 A. 2d 301 (1944).
12 Cramer v. McKinney et al., Executors, 355 Pa. 202, 49 A. 2d 374 (1946).
Is Mary Kauss v. John Rohner, Administrator of John George Kauss, Decd., Appellant, 172 Pa.
481, 33 A. 1016 (1896).
informed that his compensation would be merely "value of services". Nevertheless,
the evils of awarding the value of the property promised to be devised as the
measure of damages for the breach of an oral contract to devise real property
where there is no memorandum in writing, would undoubtedly outweigh its possi-
ble benefits. Such a policy would also be contrary to Pennsylvania's long established
rule concerning the measure of damages for breach of oral contracts for the sale
of land.14
An additional difficulty which confronts claimants in cases in which the
Statute of Frauds is involved is that Pennsylvania Courts have refused to recognize
a revoked will 1i as sufficient writing to satisfy the statute. The decisions have
followed the rule that testimony showing a legacy in a revoked will was not ad-
missible to prove the existence of a contract to make a devise in return for services
rendered unless the will itself showed or it appeared by other evidence that the
legacy was given in pursuance of a contract to make a will. Pennsylvania Courts
have consistently held that a will containing a devise which makes no reference
to the contract does not satisfy the Statute of Frauds.
Some jurisdictions take a contrary view" and have held that where a contract
to devise land in consideration of services rendered is alleged, a revoked will was
evidence of a unilateral contract and that the writing did satisfy the Statute of
Frauds.
The latter view in regard to a revoked will as evidence of a contract seems
to be the more equitable one. It would appear reasonable that a revoked will should
be sufficient memorandum in writing to be admissible as evidence of a contract
to devise land. But Pennsylvania cases do not so hold.
The third category involves the measure of damages where sufficient evid-
ence is produced to establish a contract and the contract satisfied the Statute of
Frauds. Cases which fall within this classification could lead to unjust results if
the dicta in the Jones case is strictly followed. Some older Pennsylvania cases17
did not take this view and as illustrated by the following excerpts there are also rela-
tively recent ones which are contra. In Estate of Rachel Nusbaum, Deceased's the
Court said,
"The rule seems to be that if the contract or agreement between the
parties was that the services rendered the decedent at his request should
be compensated for by a money legacy definite in amount or capable
of being ascertained, that sum may be recovered if the decedent fails
to provide for the legacy agreed upon."
14 Seidlek v. Bradley, 293 Pa. 379, 142 A. 914 (1928).
16 Supra. Note 13; Mooney's Estate, 328 Pa. 273, 194 A. 893 (1937); In Re McWilliams Estate,
162 Pa. Super. 299, 56 A. 2d 241 (1948).
Is In re Lube's Estate, 225 Wis. 365, 274 N. W. 276 (1937).
17 Thompson v. Stevens, 71 Pa. 161 (1872); Miller's Estate, 136 Pa. 349, 20 A. 565 (1890).
18 101 Pa. Super. 17 (1930).
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In Elwood's Estate,'" the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said,
"Since the contract or agreement between the parties was that the
services rendered the decedent at his request should be compensated by
a money legacy which under the testimony has been made definite in
amount, that sum may be recovered."
In 1943, Justice Baldridge, of the Pennsylvania Superior Court, seemed to
follow this view in Fondelier v. Riddle.20 This was an action of assumpsit to recover
for personal services rendered by plaintiff to a decedent. It was held on appeal
that there was sufficient evidence to establish the existence of the contract for
the payment of a definite sum for services rendered.
According to the dicta in the Jones case the measure of damages for a breach
in such a situation would be the value of the services rendered and not the estate
promised to be devised.
Therefore, under this late pronouncement by the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania which is a reiteration of the opinions in the majority of the older Penn-
sylvania cases, the measure of damages where plaintiff has given services to de-
cedent in reliance on a promise of a devise which is not made, and where the
contract is valid in every respect, is different from the measure of damages for
the breach of other types of valid contracts. There seems to be no sound reason
for the distinction. The argument, that to award the value of the thing promised
as the measure of damages would lead to fraudulent claims against decedents'
estates, is not a logical one here. If the claimant can conclusively prove either a
written or an oral contract to will the whole or part of an estate and show a breach
thereof, and the contract is not rendered invalid for any reason, there surely can
be no question of a fraudulent claim.
It is true that due to the nature of this type of claim, instances are few where
the plaintiff can surmount the formidable burden of proving a valid contract to
bequeath personal property or one to devise real property which satisfies the
Statute of Frauds, as the claimant is not a competent witness and other witnesses
are often no longer available. The long and well established principle in'l Penn-
sylvania that wages for domestic services and board bills are presumed to be paid
at stated intervals confronts many of these claimants. When a claim for such
services is presented against a decedent's estate, extending over any length of
time, the burden is on the claimant to rebut the presumption of payment. However,
where the plaintiff does succeed in overcoming these great difficulties of proof,
it seems that the measure of damages should be the value of the property promised
to be devised and not merely the value of the services rendered.
JOFFREY B. CONN
19 309 Pa. 505, 164 A. 617 (1932).
20 152 Pa. Super. 586, 23 A. 2d 86 (1943).
s1 Cummiskey's Estate, 224 Pa. 509, 73 A. 916 (1909); Winfield v. Beaver Trust Co., 229 Pa,
530, 79 A. 138 (1911); Sear's Estate, 313 Pa. 415, 169 A. 776 (1934); In re Monson's Estate 160
Pa. Super. 631, 53 A. 2d 909 (1947).
